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Abstract 
Our goal in this paper is to experimentally investigate whether folk conceptions of explanation are 
psychologistic. In particular, are people more likely to classify speech acts as explanations when they cause 
understanding in their recipient? The empirical evidence that we present suggests this is so. Using the side-
effect effect as a marker of mental state ascriptions, we argue that lay judgments of explanatory status are 
mediated by judgments of a speaker’s and/or audience’s mental states. First, we show that attributions of 
both understanding and explanation exhibit a side-effect effect.  Next, we show that when the speaker’s 
and audience’s level of understanding is stipulated, the explanation side-effect effect goes away entirely. 
These results not only extend the side-effect effect to attributions of understanding, they also suggest that 
attributions of explanation exhibit a side-effect effect because they depend upon attributions of 
understanding, supporting the idea that folk conceptions of explanation are psychologistic. 
Keywords: Explanation, understanding, side-effect effect, psychologism 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Explanation and Understanding 
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Explanation and understanding often go hand in hand. Explanations can generate understanding, and, on 
some views, understanding consists in knowledge or grasp of explanations (e.g., Strevens 2013, Khalifa in 
press). But is understanding essential to explanation? Or is it merely a common and desirable consequence, 
a symptom of explanations? 
 On the one hand, philosophers of science for many years took it as a datum that there could be 
explanations without understanding, and the intuition is compelling—clearly there can be explanations of 
phenomena so complex or cosmic in scope that it beggars belief to suppose the human mind could ever 
grasp them. Hempel and Oppenheim (1948, p. 17), in particular, argued against ‘psychologistic’ approaches 
to explanation based on the following dilemma: either understanding is objective or subjective. Subjective 
understanding is associated with a ‘feeling of empathic familiarity’ (ibid.), and so on this horn a 
requirement that explanations engender understanding is odious (at least to a positivist philosopher of 
science). Objective understanding is just what one has when one knows a D-N explanation, and so on this 
horn a requirement that explanation engender understanding is superfluous. (For a discussion of this 
dilemma and what it leaves out, see Wilkenfeld 2014.)  
 On the other hand, alternative strands of philosophical work (e.g., Wilkenfeld 2014) have been 
more favorable to psychologism about explanation—the view that it is at least partially constitutive of an 
explanation to be conducive to understanding. These strands suggest that understanding is an important 
tool in our conceptual toolkit when attempting to elucidate the nature of explanation. This perspective is 
supported by recent empirical work on scientists’ and laypeople’s conception of explanation: Specifically, 
work by Waskan, Harmon, Horne, Spino, and Clevenger (2014) suggests that both scientists and laypeople 
consider an intellectual achievement to be an explanation only when it actually causes understanding in 
someone.  
 Our goal in this paper is to apply an existing paradigm in a new area to experimentally investigate 
whether folk conceptions of explanation are in fact psychologistic. That is, do people only countenance 
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speech acts as explanations when they cause understanding in their recipient? The empirical evidence that 
we present suggests this is so. Our main argument will involve a novel deployment of a tool whose full 
implications are still being explored—the presence of a side-effect effect (SEE) (described in §1.3) as a 
marker for attributions of the mental.3 
We begin in §1.2 with an examination of a recent empirical finding that supports psychologism 
about explanation, while noting some boundaries of that finding that our own research aims to 
complement. In §1.3 we introduce the SEE as a phenomenon that we can repurpose as a marker for 
whether the classification of something as an ‘explanation’ depends on the mental states attributed to the 
agents involved. This sets up §1.4, in which we utilize our interpretation of the SEE and its applications to 
motivate our main empirical research questions. In §2-§4 we present our new experimental results which, 
we argue, jointly provide a proof-of-concept of using the SEE as a means to probe mental state attributions, 
defend psychologism about explanation, and demonstrate some of the contours of the SEE as well. In §5 we 
revisit our tentative assumption regarding the explanation of the SEE, and present a dilemma wherein, 
whatever scope one thinks the SEE has, one has to draw novel conclusions from our data. We also explore 
alternative explanations for the effects that we observe. In §6 we explicitly compare our results to those of 
Waskan et al. (2014), highlighting some dimensions along which our research continues to advance their 
program.  
1.2 The Data on Psychologism of Explanation 
 While philosophers have for some time debated what we have characterized as psychologism about 
explanation, there have been few studies that attempt to measure whether such psychologism does or 
does not characterize laypeople’s conception of explanation. We contend that understanding laypeople’s 
conception is important whether or not this descriptive psychological project is regarded as continuous or 
                                                          
3 While there has a great deal of work exploring the side-effect effect itself, using it as a tool to look at the contours of 
a concept like explanation is a somewhat different approach. 
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discontinuous with the philosophical project of developing an account of explanation. On the former view, 
data concerning laypeople’s judgments and explanatory practices is an important constraint on theorizing. 
On the latter view, these data can help us overcome cognitive biases that arise in developing an objective 
or normative account of explanation.  
 Waskan et al. (2014) have done the most thorough study of whether laypeople and scientists 
consider the generation of understanding (‘intelligibility’) in evaluating what constitutes an explanation. In 
an initial study, participants read vignettes involving a scientist who makes a new discovery regarding the 
cause of gamma ray bursts from a distant galaxy. The scientist produces a model, but the stated 
characteristics of this model vary across conditions. In some cases, the model allows the scientist to ‘come 
to understand’ the cause of the gamma ray bursts. In a second case, understanding has not yet been 
achieved, but the model could enable a competent scientist who examines the model to come to 
understand. In a final case, the model is so complex that it would not allow someone to come to 
understand, yet it still possesses many of the other, more objective virtues of explanations, such as 
predictive power. Participants indicated their agreement or disagreement with the statement that the 
model the scientist produced ‘constitutes an explanation’ (Waskan et al 2014 p. 1023).4 Waskan et al. found 
that people indicated significantly greater agreement with the statement that the model constitutes an 
explanation when it produced actual understanding as opposed to potential understanding or no 
understanding. 
In subsequent experiments, Waskan et al. presented more complex vignettes with the same basic 
structure, varying whether a scientific model produced actual understanding, potential understanding, or 
no understanding. They also varied the way in which they assessed the association between explanation 
and understanding by employing a variant of a semantic integration task: participants first read a vignette 
                                                          
4 The authors are at pains to distinguish the question of whether or not understanding-generation is necessary for a 
model to count as an explanation at all from the further question of whether it is a good-making feature of an 
explanation. 
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that did not explicitly classify a scientific model as an explanation, and later answered questions designed 
to assess whether they had activated the concept of ‘explanation’ in reading about the model. Specifically, 
participants were asked whether the following ‘claim [was] likely to be true based upon what they read,’ 
that: ‘Dr. Brown’s paper and the accompanying computer model provide an explanation for why type-B2 
stars produce gamma-ray bursts’ (Waskan et al 2014 p. 1028). Mirroring their initial results, Waskan et al. 
found that both laypeople and scientists endorsed the statement that the model provided an explanation 
when it generated actual understanding, but endorsed the statement at lower rates when it was only 
potentially intelligible or never intelligible. 
Waskan et al. (2014) conclude that laypeople’s and scientists’ conception of explanation is 
importantly psychologistic: actual intelligibility appears to be a necessary condition for classifying a model 
as an explanation. This certainly departs from the anti-psychologism advocated by Hempel and others, but 
Waskan et al. are also careful to distance their characterization of the folk/scientific conception from the 
kind of psychologism that philosophers most often reject: the idea that explanation is a matter of 
supporting or achieving some affective state or feeling of familiarity. Instead, they identify explanation with 
intelligibility, which they describe as ‘the more intellectual occurrence of understanding how or why, at 
least possibly, the target of explanation came about’ (p. 1019). 
While Waskan et al.’s studies provide compelling evidence of a close relationship between 
explanation and understanding, it’s challenging to make the stronger claim that intelligibility is partially 
constitutive of explanation. Instead, it could be that participants treat intelligibility as evidence for the 
presence of some objective feature F, where this feature F is what is partially constitutive of explanation. 
Waskan et al. do several things to help rule out this possibility: across conditions they stipulate that the 
models all have various objective virtues (such as robustly predicting the explanandum), and they show that 
the models do not differ in plausibility. At the same time, other features of the studies leave this as a live 
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option. For instance, the second set of studies indicated that a model was actually intelligible by including 
the following text: 
After a full year spent doing little else, Dr. Brown finally declared that he was able to detect some 
high-level (coarse-grained) structures and behavioral patterns that enabled him to make sense of 
why each distinct new simulation gravitated towards the same end state…a puff of gamma-ray 
energy, followed by a blast. 
 
When the model was only potentially intelligible, the vignette instead stipulated that ‘although no one has 
yet been able to decipher the relevant high-level variables from the materials Dr. Brown provided, it is only 
a matter of time before someone does’ (p. 1028). If ‘high-level (coarse-grained) structures and behavioral 
patterns’ is our feature F, then the differences across vignettes could reflect the difference between 
actually possessing F, potentially possessing F, and definitely not possessing F. 
We raise these worries not to question the value of Waskan et al.’s studies, but to underscore some 
open questions and to motivate the approach that we adopt in our own studies. Specifically, in an effort to 
obtain more direct evidence concerning whether understanding is partially constitutive of explanation, our 
experiments use simpler explanations, thereby preventing participants from making different assumptions 
about the objective features of the explanations themselves. We also test for effects of mental states (i.e., 
the presence of understanding) in explanation judgments using a very different approach: by investigating 
whether attributions of explanations and understanding are susceptible to a ‘side-effect effect.’ We explain 
the logic behind this approach in the section that follows. 
1.3 Using the SEE as a Marker of the Mental 
The side-effect effect (SEE) is by now a well-known result in several areas of philosophy, including the 
philosophy of action and epistemology. First reported by Knobe (2003), the original finding was that 
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people’s judgments regarding whether a foreseen side-effect of someone’s actions was brought about 
intentionally varied depending on whether the foreseen side-effect was good or bad. For example, a 
businessman who was told his actions in pursuit of profits would bring about environmental harm was 
judged to have brought about the harm intentionally, whereas a businessman in a symmetrical case of 
environmental benefit was said not to have brought about the benefit intentionally. Beebe and Buckwalter 
(2010) extended this finding to the epistemic realm, showing that whether the businessman is judged to 
have known that a consequence would result from his action depends on whether the side-effect is good or 
bad. Other results (e.g., Knobe 2007, Uttich & Lombrozo 2010) have shown that it is not moral badness per 
se that leads to higher attributions of intentionality, but rather the violation of some operative norm.  
 What drives the SEE? Uttich and Lombrozo (2010) develop one account of the effect, according to 
which it reflects inferences about mental states. They argue that when someone acts in violation of a 
known, operative norm, one can infer that the person had a reason for action that was sufficiently strong to 
outweigh the reason to conform to the norm. For instance, from the fact that a businessman was willing to 
pursue a plan despite its environmental cost, we can infer that he valued money much more highly than the 
environment. By contrast, an action that is norm-conforming is far less diagnostic of underlying mental 
states: we have strong evidence that the CEO who harmed the environment values money much more 
highly than the environment; we have weaker evidence that this is so for the CEO who helps the 
environment. If this account is right, then the SEE’s characteristic asymmetry in attributions reflects 
differences in the mental states inferred across cases of norm-violation versus norm-conformity. Most 
importantly for our purposes, the SEE can be used as an index of whether some attribution is sensitive to 
mental states. 
 To use the SEE to evaluate psychologism about explanation, we would need to present participants 
with cases in which a candidate explanation is offered in a norm-conforming versus a norm-violating 
context. For instance, the businessman could be provided with information about how the proposed 
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business plan would lead to environmental harm versus benefit, and participants would then be asked to 
evaluate whether the information that was provided constitutes an explanation. If the lay conception of 
explanation is psychologistic, we would expect greater agreement with the claim that an explanation was 
provided when the action violated a norm (leading to environmental harm) than when it did not. If the 
relevant mental state that generates this asymmetry is understanding, we would further expect 
corresponding effects for understanding attribution (i.e., ‘the businessman understood how the program 
would generate environmental harm’). Finally, if the presence or absence of understanding is sufficient to 
determine whether an explanation has been offered, we would expect that fixing understanding by 
stipulation should block the effect of norm-conformity versus norm-violation on judgments concerning 
explanation. These are the predictions that our studies test. 
While prior work has not investigated whether an SEE obtains for attributions of understanding, 
there’s reason to believe that there should be one. After Knobe’s original demonstration with 
‘intentionally,’ the effect was extended to a wide range of attributions that involved a component desire or 
pro attitude, including: ‘intended’, ‘desired’, ‘decided’, ‘advocated’ 5, and ‘was in favor of’ (for a summary, 
see Knobe & Pettit 2009). It was then expanded to include psychological attributions that involve measures 
of belief, including ‘knew’ (Beebe & Buckwalter 2010) and ‘believed’ (Alfano, Beebe, & Robinson 2012, 
Beebe 2013). For instance, participants indicate that the businessman was more likely to know about the 
program’s environmental side effects and to believe they would occur when those side effects were 
negative as opposed to positive.6 The picture that seems to have emerged is that we exhibit an SEE for a 
                                                          
5 ‘Advocated’ proves a bit awkward here, as it does not obviously involve any mental state. Pettit and Knobe (2009) 
assume that advocating something requires having a pro-attitude towards it; if correct, ‘advocated’ would fall under 
the general rubric of pro-attitude attribution. There is reason to suspect that this is right—in an unreported pilot 
experiment, we measured whether claims of the form ‘X said Y’ exhibit an SEE, and found no significant effect. This 
suggests that what is doing the work in the case of ‘advocated’ is the pro-attitude on top of what is said. 
6 One hypothesis is that many instances of the SEE result from an increased willingness to attribute beliefs (Alfano et al 
2012, Beebe 2013, Dalbauer & Hergovich 2013), perhaps because norm-violating behavior gives us more information 
(Uttich & Lombrozo 2010). 
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broad range of attributions that depend on mental states; it’s a short leap from knowing that the side effect 
would occur to understanding why it would occur.7 
While there is no agreed-upon interpretation of what causes the SEE, for our purposes, we only 
need to accept the relatively minimal assumption that the SEE reflects mental state ascriptions – and even 
this relatively minimal assumption will be revisited and weakened in §5. If the asymmetric attributions that 
characterize the SEE reflect attributions of mental states such as understanding, then the presence of an 
SEE for explanation would provide especially strong evidence for psychologism: we would have evidence 
that explanation judgments depend on inferred mental states. Moreover, by holding fixed the objective 
properties of the speech acts under evaluation, we can be more confident that asymmetric attributions 
reflect inferences about mental states, not inferences about underspecified but potentially objective 
properties of the explanation.  
 One might reasonably ask why we use the SEE rather than more directly testing the relationship 
between explanation and some particular mental state, such as understanding or belief. The key is the 
generality of the SEE: we can investigate whether explanation is psychologistic without first identifying the 
full set of relevant mental states. This yields two benefits. First, while we do ultimately tie explanation to 
one particular mental state (namely understanding), first establishing the more general point that 
explanation is tied to some mental state attribution(s) makes the broader claim independently acceptable. 
Second, having a marker for mental state attribution more broadly helps us to determine whether and 
when we have identified a set of mental states that is sufficient to satisfy the mental state requirements for 
an explanation: when we have succeeded, we should be able to eliminate the SEE for explanation by 
                                                          
7 There is (to our knowledge) one possible exception to the general claim that attributions of all-and-only mental 
states exhibit an SEE. Knobe and Fraser (2008) find that people are more likely to say that X’s actions caused a certain 
result if the action was norm-violating. However—as anyone who has taught an introductory ethics class can attest—
laypeople often conflate causal responsibility with ethical responsibility. As such, we are not inclined to read too much 
into this result. 
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stipulating the relevant mental states in this set. Using the SEE thus allows us to determine both whether 
mental states are involved, and also which mental states are sufficient. 
 
 
1.4 Overview of Experiments 
Our general methodology will involve using the SEE as a tool for revealing that some inference to a mental 
state (such as understanding) underlies the application of “explanation.” We proceed in three steps. First, 
in Experiment 1, we show that (as expected) understanding attributions display an understanding epistemic 
side-effect effect (UESEE). Next, in Experiment 2, we show that explanation attributions display an 
explanation epistemic side-effect effect (EESEE). Finally, in Experiment 3, we demonstrate experimentally 
that stipulating the presence or absence of understanding is sufficient to block the influence of norm-
conformity versus norm-violation on judgments of explanation – that is, that stipulating understanding 
eliminates the EESEE. 
 
2. Experiment 1  
In this experiment, we extend the ESEE for knowledge-that to knowledge-why, as well as to understanding-
that and understanding-why. The ever-widening scope of the SEE suggests that prior results pertaining to 
knowledge-why should extend to understanding-why. However, some prior research (e.g., Wilkenfeld, 
Plunkett, & Lombrozo, 2016) has found that attributions of knowledge and understanding can come apart. 
It was therefore important to demonstrate, rather than assume, that we would observe an SEE for 
attributions of understanding. Experiment 1 thus lays the groundwork for Experiment 2, in which we 
investigated whether we observe an SEE for explanation. If psychologism about explanation is correct, and 
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the mental state that is necessary for a speech act to count as an explanation is understanding, then it’s 
important to show that the SEE indeed tracks attributions of understanding. 
2.1 Method 
Participants: Two-hundred-and-nine participants (133 male, 75 female, 1 other; mean age 32, SD = 9) were 
recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk marketplace (MTurk) and participated in exchange for 
monetary compensation. In all experiments, participation was restricted to users with an IP address within 
the United States, with an approval rating of at least 95% based on at least 50 previous tasks, and who had 
not completed another experiment in the sequence. An additional 14 participants were excluded prior to 
analysis for failing to consent, failing to complete the experiment, or giving an incorrect response to one of 
the reading comprehension or attention-check questions (described below).8  
Materials and Procedure: At the beginning of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to read 
one of eight vignettes describing a chairman of a company in the Gizmo industry deciding whether to start 
a new program, after his vice president informs him of a potential side effect of the decision. The eight 
vignettes varied along three dimensions: whether the side effect would comply with or violate some 
operative norm (2: conform, violate), whether or not the vice president described a mechanism that 
brought about the side effect (2: mechanism absent, mechanism present), and whether the norm in 
question was moral or conventional (2: moral, conventional). The mechanism variable was introduced to 
ensure that understanding judgments would not be near floor, and to ensure that any effects were robust 
across levels of mechanistic detail. The type of norm variable (moral versus conventional) was introduced 
to ensure the generality of any effects. 
                                                          
8 Excluding participants on the basis of an attentional or comprehension check is common practice in psychology, and 
our exclusion rate is not out of line with prior research. Given the probability of internet participants multi-tasking or 
otherwise not devoting full attention, it is standard practice to recruit a large number of participants (Crump, 
McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013; Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009), with the expectation that surveys tracking 
more nuanced differences will eliminate upwards of 40% (Downs, Holbrook, & Sheng, 2010). 
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To illustrate, the vignette involving a conventional violation with the mechanism present read as 
follows [with the text for the norm-conforming variant in brackets]:  
The convention in the Gizmo industry is for Gizmos to be a light [dark] color. Specifically, the 
convention is to make Gizmos that are colored lighter [darker] than navy blue. This color preference 
had been the standard for decades, and it was well-supported by sales and tradition. The original 
founder of the Gizmo industry insisted on the light [dark] color as a characteristic feature of the 
product. 
  
The vice-president of a company in the Gizmo industry went to the chairman of the board and said, 
‘‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will result in our 
Gizmos being colored black. The convention is to make Gizmos colored lighter [darker] than navy 
blue, so we would be violating [complying with] the convention.’  
  
The vice-president went on to describe in painstaking detail the mechanism by which the Gizmos 
would appear black. Among other things, he told the chairman that the new program would involve 
making a product that would require a new form of sealant, the application of which would lead to 
oxidation of the metal the Gizmo is made out of, which would lead to the whole thing taking on a black 
color. 
  
The chairman of the board answered, ‘‘I don’t care at all about the color of the Gizmos. I just want to 
make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.’ 
  
They started the program. As it happened, the Gizmos were black, darker than navy blue and 
violating [complying with] the convention. 
 
In the moral condition, the norm specified an acceptable risk for increasing carbon emissions, and the 
proposed program either conformed to or violated (exceeded) the norm. The mechanism absent vignettes 
13 
 
 
were identical to the corresponding mechanism present vignettes, except that the paragraph describing the 
mechanism (beginning with ‘The vice-president went on to describe…’) was omitted entirely. 
After reading one of the eight vignettes, all participants were asked to rate their agreement with 
each of the following six claims, presented in randomized order. The first five were treated as dependent 
variables of interest, whereas the sixth was used as a measure of reading comprehension for screening 
participants: 
a. The chairman knew why the new program would [harm the environment/lead to the Gizmos 
being black]. 
b. The chairman knew that the new program would [harm the environment/lead to the Gizmos 
being black]. 
c. The chairman understood why the new program would [harm the environment/lead to the 
Gizmos being black]. 
d. The chairman understood that the new program would [harm the environment/lead to the 
Gizmos being black]. 
e. The chairman intentionally [harmed the environment/caused the Gizmos to be black].  
f. [The environment was harmed as a result of the new program./The Gizmos produced as part of 
this program were black.] 
Answers were given on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree (coded as 1 
and 7, respectively). Participants then had to complete an attention check modeled after Oppenheimer, 
Meyvis, and Davidenko (2009). To conclude, they were asked demographic and debriefing questions. 
Participants who made errors on the comprehension question (by not responding above the scale 
midpoint) or on the attention check were excluded from further analysis.  
2.2 Results 
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First, we verified that we could replicate the SEE with our modified vignettes by testing whether there was 
a significant effect of norm status on intentionality attributions. A univariate ANOVA with norm status (2: 
conform, violate), norm type (2: moral, conventional) and mechanism (2: mechanism absent, mechanism 
present) as between-subjects factors revealed the predicted significant effect of norm status on 
intentionality judgments, F(1, 201) = 9.425, p = .002, ηp2 = .045, with significantly lower ratings in the 
conform condition (N = 101, M = 4.40, SD = 1.955) than in the violate condition (N = 108, M = 5.24, SD = 
1.884), and no significant interactions. This replicates prior research, and corresponds to a small-to-medium 
effect size.  
Having established the standard SEE, we tested whether we would observe an effect of norm 
conformity on attributions of knowledge and understanding. Knowledge and understanding attributions 
were analyzed with a mixed ANOVA with attribution type (2: understanding, knowledge) and attribution 
object (2: why, that) as within-subjects factors, and with norm status (2: conform, violate), norm type (2: 
moral, conventional) and mechanism (2: mechanism absent, mechanism present) as between subjects 
factors (see Figure 1).  
The mixed ANOVA revealed several main effects. Most importantly, participants provided 
significantly higher ratings in the violate conditions than in the conform conditions, F(1, 201) = 12.531, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .059. This effect was moderate in size, and it was not qualified by interactions with attribution 
type, F(1, 201) = .054, p = .817, ηp2 = .000, nor attribution object, F(1, 201) = .190, p = .663, ηp2 = .001. This 
suggests that we succeeded in replicating the ESEE found in prior work involving knowledge-that, and also 
found a comparable SEE for knowledge-why, understanding-that, and understanding-why. 
There were additional significant effects that do not bear on our central hypotheses. The analysis 
revealed a main effect of mechanism, F(1, 201) = 29.365,  p < .001, ηp2 = .127, with higher ratings in the 
mechanism present conditions than in the mechanism absent conditions, and a main effect of attribution 
object, F(1, 201) = 78.156, p < .001, ηp2 = .280, with higher ratings for ‘that’ statements than for ‘why’ 
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statements. In addition, there were two significant interactions. First, there was a significant interaction 
between norm type and attribution, F(1, 201) = 4.133,  p = .043, ηp2 = .020: participants always gave higher 
ratings for moral than for conventional norms, but the difference was greater for knowledge than for 
understanding. Second, there was a three-way interaction between attribution object, conformity, and 
mechanism, F(1, 201) = 4.298, p = .039, ηp2 = .021: when the mechanism was present, it disproportionately 
increased the effect of norm-violation on ratings of why-statements. (We hypothesize that the presence of 
a mechanistic description made participants more sensitive to any difference between thinking about why 
something happened versus thinking that something happened.)  
 
 
Figure 1: Mean attribution ratings from Experiment 1 as a function of norm status, attribution type, and 
attribution object, Error Bars ± 1 SEM 
 
2.3 Discussion 
The main finding of Experiment 1 was that there was an observed SEE for understanding, and, outside of a 
three-way interaction that indicates mechanistic detail somehow exacerbates the effect for ‘why’ 
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statements only, no significant interactions between the SEE and any other variables. Most importantly, 
there was no interaction between conformity and attribution type nor between conformity and attribution 
object—the SEE manipulation affected knowledge and understanding—as well as that- and why-
statements—alike. This suggests that the SEE can reflect attributions of understanding as well as 
attributions of knowledge.9 
 
3. Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, we extended the range of the SEE to include knowledge-why, understanding-why, and 
understanding-that. As pretheoretically it is plausible that these are constituted by or at least partially 
supervene on mental states, the findings of Experiment 1, while novel, were not necessarily surprising. 
Conversely, explanation is standardly taken to be an objective state, devoid of reference to individuals’ 
mental states (for exceptions to this position, see §1). It would thus be relatively surprising to show that the 
SEE influenced judgments of the form ‘X offered an explanation why P’, which is precisely what we set out 
to demonstrate in Experiment 2. Since attribution object and mechanism for the most part did not interact 
with the SEE manipulation of interest (norm status) in Experiment 1, they were dropped from further study. 
We were also concerned that somehow being in a violate condition prompted participants to give higher 
ratings for every possible question—to that end, a control question that clearly did not involve anything 
mental was added. 
3.1 Method 
                                                          
9 As an added boon, the results of Experiment 1 support the contention that understanding states are evaluated by 
the same mechanisms that we use to evaluate (other) mental states. This result is a prediction of some (more 
mentalistic) views of understanding (e.g., Wilkenfeld 2013, Kelp 2015), but a surprising (though not necessarily 
inconsistent) result on others (e.g., de Regt & Dieks 2005), and directly opposed to still others (e.g., Ylikoski 2009). 
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Participants: Two-hundred-and-ninety-two participants (176 male, 113 female, 2 other, 1 blank; mean age 
33, SD = 9) were recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk marketplace (MTurk) as in Experiment 1 
and participated in exchange for monetary compensation. An additional 41 participants were excluded 
prior to analysis following the same procedure used in Experiment 1. Participants who had participated in 
Experiment 1 were not eligible to participate in Experiment 2. 
Materials and Procedure: At the beginning of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to read 
one of four vignettes similar to those from Experiment 1. The vignettes varied along two dimensions: 
whether the side-effect would comply with or violate some operative norm (2: conform, violate), and 
whether the norm in question was moral or conventional (2: moral, conventional).  
To allow for variation in participants’ judgments about whether an explanation had been offered, 
each vignette included a minimal description of the mechanism. For example, in the conventional violation 
condition, participants read a passage including the following [text for corresponding conform variant in 
brackets]: 
  
The vice-president of a company in the Gizmo industry went to the chairman of the board and said, 
‘‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will result in our 
Gizmos being black. The convention is to make Gizmos lighter [darker] than navy blue, so we would 
be violating [complying with] the convention.’  
  
The vice-president went on to give a brief description of the mechanism by which the Gizmos would 
appear black. He told the chairman that the new program would involve making a product that would 
require a new chemical procedure, which would lead to the whole thing taking on a blackish color. 
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After reading one of the four vignettes, all participants were asked to rate their agreement with the 
following four claims (in randomized order). The first three were treated as dependent variables of interest, 
and the fourth was used as a measure of reading comprehension to screen participants: 
a. The vice president offered the chairman an explanation why the new program would [harm 
the environment/lead to the Gizmos being black]. 
b. The chairman understood why the new program would [harm the environment/lead to the 
Gizmos being black]. 
c. The chairman intentionally [harmed the environment/caused the Gizmos to be black]. 
d. [The environment was harmed as a result of the new program./The Gizmos produced as 
part of this program were black.] 
Participants then advanced to a new page on which they were presented with the following information: 
As it happens, the secretary in the next room was testing a new audio recorder that would record all 
interactions in the chairman’s office. It wasn’t working very well, and only successfully recorded 
about half the time. How likely do you think it is that the following statement is true?  
 
e. The audio recorder captured the vice president’s description of the new program. 
 
Participants rated the likelihood on a 7-point scale. This question was included as a control to ensure that 
participants were not providing higher ratings in the violate conditions indiscriminately. The content of the 
item was designed to match the provision of an explanation in terms of its physical characteristics (i.e., a 
spoken signal transmitted from one source to another), but without the potential role for mental states 
that explanation could involve.  
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Finally, participants completed an attention check as in Experiment 1, and were asked demographic 
and debriefing questions. Participants who made errors on the comprehension question or attention check 
were excluded from further analysis.  
3.2 Results 
First, we analyzed the intentionality question to ensure that we replicated the traditional SEE, and the 
control ‘recorder’ question to ensure that participants were not showing an SEE indiscriminately. For the 
intentionality variable, a univariate ANOVA with norm status (2: conform, violate) and norm type (2: moral, 
conventional) as between-subjects factors revealed the predicted effect of norm status, F(1, 288) = 20.467, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .066, with significantly lower ratings in the conform condition (N = 149, M = 4.21, SD = 1.971) 
than in the violate condition (N = 143, M = 5.13, SD = 1.900). This involved a medium effect size, and no 
interactions with other variables. For the recorder question, a t-test comparing responses to the recorder 
question for conform (N = 149, M = 4.19, SD = 1.170) versus violate (N = 143, M = 4.39, SD = 1.114) revealed 
no significant effect, t(290) = -1.522, p = .129, d = .18. These results jointly indicate that the SEE 
manipulation was successful, but that it did not cause all ratings to shift indiscriminately.  
We next turned to the dependent variables of greatest interest: explanation and understanding. 
Responses were analyzed with a mixed ANOVA with attribution type (2: explanation, understanding) as a 
within-subjects factor and norm status (2: conform, violate) and norm type (2: moral, conventional) as 
between-subjects factors (Fig. 2). This analysis revealed a main effect of norm status, F(1, 288) = 9.151, p = 
.003, ηp2 = .031, with significantly higher ratings in the violate condition than in the conform condition. This 
main effect was not qualified by an interaction with attribution type, F(1, 288) = 1.750, p = .187, ηp2 = .006, 
which suggests that the effect of conformity applied to understanding and explanation judgments alike, and 
with a small-to-medium effect size. 
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The analysis revealed two additional significant main effects, neither of which bears on our central 
hypotheses. Ratings for explanation were significantly higher than for understanding, F(1, 288) =  39.026, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .119, and participants gave significantly higher ratings for moral norms than for conventional 
norms, F(1, 288) = 4.029, p = .046, ηp2 = .014. There was also an interaction between attribution type and 
norm type: participants were more likely in the moral case to say that the chairman understands, but less 
likely to say that the VP explained, F(1, 288) = 59.897, p < .001, ηp2 = .117. 
 
Figure 2: Mean attribution ratings from Experiment 2 as a function of norm status and judgment. Error Bars 
± 1 SEM 
 
  
1
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Table 1 
Explanation and Understanding Attributions in Experiment 2 by Norm Status and 
Norm Type 
 
 Norm Status Norm Type Mean Std. 
Deviation 
N 
 
Explanation 
Attribution 
Conform Conventional 5.64 1.646 77 
Moral 5.28 1.638 72 
Total 5.46 1.646 149 
Violate Conventional 5.94 1.371 70 
Moral 5.66 1.601 73 
Total 5.80 1.494 143 
Total Conventional 5.78 1.524 147 
Moral 5.47 1.625 145 
Total 5.63 1.580 292 
Understanding 
Attribution 
Conform Conventional 4.30 1.606 77 
Moral 5.04 1.850 72 
Total 4.66 1.762 149 
Violate Conventional 4.70 1.688 70 
Moral 5.88 1.527 73 
Total 5.30 1.708 143 
Total Conventional 4.49 1.653 147 
Moral 5.46 1.740 145 
Total 4.97 1.762 292 
 
 
While these results indicate that attributions of explanation are susceptible to a SEE, consistent 
with psychologism, they do not establish the more specific claim that understanding is the mental state that 
partially constitutes explanation. As initial support for this stronger claim, we can investigate whether norm 
conformity affected explanation attributions because norm conformity influenced attributions of 
understanding, which in turn influenced attributions of explanation. In other words, we can test for 
whether the effect of norm conformity on explanation attributions was mediated by attributions of 
understanding. To do so, we used the SPSS PROCESS macro written by Andrew Hayes to test for an indirect 
effect of norm status on explanation via understanding; this test indeed revealed significant mediation 
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(95% confidence interval .0768 to .3743). A hierarchical regression revealed that once attributions of 
understanding were included in the model, incorporating norm status did not significantly improve 
predictions of attributions of explanation, with a change in R-squared of .002, p = .470. Conversely, the 
PROCESS macro revealed that the indirect effect of explanation on understanding was not significant (95% 
confidence interval -.0065 to .2735), suggesting that there was no significant mediation in the other 
direction. In other words, we failed to find support for an alternative hypothesis according to which 
attributions of understanding depend on attributions of explanation. This provides some additional 
statistical confirmation that participants’ judgments of whether an explanation had been offered were not 
merely correlated with judgments of understanding or driven by a shared cause, but actually depended on 
understanding judgments themselves, as predicted by psychologism.  
 
3.3 Discussion 
Experiment 2 found that manipulating whether a norm was adhered to or violated affects not only whether 
someone is said to have understanding, but also whether someone else is taken to have provided an 
explanation.10 This finding supports a psychologistic account of laypeople’s conception of explanation: 
                                                          
10 One commenter raised the question of whether the SEE for explanation appeared not because participants were 
psychologistic about explanation, but rather because they were psychologistic about whether something had been 
offered. To test this hypothesis, we ran a supplementary study (focusing on the moral case) in which we varied 
whether participants evaluated the statement “The vice-president offered the chairman an explanation of why the 
new program would harm the environment” or “What the vice-president said amounted to an explanation of why the 
new program would harm the environment.” We predicted that we would continue to find an SEE, and that it would 
not interact with wording choice. This is what we found in an initial study with 639 participants (post-exclusion). Due 
to a typo found in that survey (one statement included “help/harm the environment” rather than simply “harm the 
environment”), we then ran another 614 participants (post-exclusion) with a corrected copy. We analyzed the 
combined sample with an ANOVA on explanation rating (i.e., people’s agreement with whichever statement they saw) 
with norm status (2: conform, violate), wording (2: offered, amounted) and survey number (2: survey 1, survey 2) as 
between-subjects factors. This analysis revealed significantly higher ratings in the violate condition (N = 625, M = 5.26, 
SD = 1.799) than in the conform condition (N = 628, M = 4.94, SD = 1.837), F(1, 1245) = 9.79, p = .002, ηp2 = .008), with 
no interaction between norm status and either wording, F(1, 1245) = 1.37, p = .242, or survey number, F(1, 1245) = 
2.071, p  =.150, and no three-way interaction, F(1, 1245) = .409, p = .523. Interestingly, there was a main effect of 
wording, with participants giving higher ratings for offered (N = 626, M = 5.43, SD =1.674) than amounted (N = 627, M 
= 4.78, SD = 1.913), F(1, 1245) = 39.850, p < .001, ηp2 = .031. It is perhaps surprising that it is easier to offer an 
 
23 
 
 
explanation judgments were susceptible to an SEE, which we take as evidence for an influence of mental 
state inferences. Moreover, mediation analyses suggest that explanation judgments were affected by 
understanding judgments, and not conversely. Finally, a new control item further demonstrated that the 
SEE for explanation did not result from a promiscuous attribution-increasing tendency when faced with a 
story about norm violation, but instead reflects something particular about attributions involving mental 
states. 
 
4. Experiment 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that judgments concerning explanation and understanding are 
susceptible to an SEE. However, several questions remain open. Most crucially, our interpretation of these 
results (as evidence for psychologism about explanation) rests on two assumptions: that the SEE for 
explanation reflects an effect of mental state inferences, and that the relevant mental state is 
understanding. In Experiment 3 we verify our interpretation by experimentally testing whether stipulating 
the presence or absence of understanding affects judgments concerning explanation, and whether doing so 
fully blocks the effect of norm status on explanation judgments. If explanation judgments instead support 
an SEE for some reason related to mental states other than understanding, or via some different 
mechanism altogether, we would instead expect an explanation SEE to manifest even though 
understanding has been stipulated.   
A second aim of Experiment 3 was to investigate whose understanding is relevant to explanation 
judgments: the person providing an explanation or the recipient of the explanation. In Waskan et al.’s 
vignettes, the scientist who produced the explanatory model was also its recipient. However, their 
predictions and interpretation suggest that the crucial feature of their vignette is that actual understanding 
                                                          
explanation than to have what one says amount to an explanation, but this finding is orthogonal to the present 
concern. 
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is achieved; not that it is achieved by any particular recipient. In Experiment 3, we further manipulate —by 
stipulation – whether the explanation provider achieved understanding and/or whether the recipient 
achieved understanding to test whether the explanation’s intended recipient is somehow privileged. 
4.1 Method 
Participants: Three-hundred-and-eighty-two participants (229 male, 151 female, 2 other; mean age 32, SD = 
9) were recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk marketplace (MTurk) as in Experiments 1-2 and 
participated in exchange for monetary compensation. An additional 67 participants were excluded prior to 
analysis following the same procedure used in Experiments 1 and 2. Participants in any other experiment in 
the sequence were not eligible to participate in Experiment 3. 
Materials and Procedure: At the beginning of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to read 
one of eight vignettes similar to those in Experiment 1 and 2. The vignettes varied along three dimensions: 
whether the side-effect would conform with or violate an operative environmental norm (2: conform, 
violate), whether the vice-president understood why it would have the effect that it would have (2: VP 
understood, VP did not understand), and whether the chairman understood why it would have that effect 
(2: Chairman understood, Chairman did not understand). Given the number of conditions involved, we 
dropped a manipulation of norm type; all vignettes involved environmental/moral norms. 
 The materials were exactly the same as those in the moral conditions of Experiment 2, with the 
exception that explicit statements were added stipulating whether the vice-president and/or the chairman 
understood why the program would harm the environment (while being clear that in every case the person 
believed that it would, to avoid inadvertently manipulating the agents’ beliefs, as well).11 For example, in 
                                                          
11 While the finding of an UESEE on Alfano et al’s (2012) interpretation does suggest that belief is a component of 
understanding, it does not imply that it is the only component—therefore, understanding could still be manipulated 
separately. 
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the both-understand-violate condition, participants read the following [text for corresponding comply 
variant in brackets]: 
 
There is a regulatory agency for the Gizmo industry that exists in order to provide environmental 
standards, even though it does not have the authority to ensure compliance with these standards. 
The regulatory agency has established an environmental standard, which states that a company may 
only start new programs if the company's total increase of carbon emissions would be less than 5% 
[45%] of the emissions from the previous year, since carbon emissions cause environmental harm. 
This 5% [45%] limit has been the standard for decades. 
  
The vice-president of a company in the Gizmo industry went to the chairman of the board and said, 
‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will increase our 
carbon emissions by 25%. The industry standard is only to start programs of this type when they 
would increase carbon emissions by less than 5% [45%], so we would be violating [complying with] 
the standard.’ 
  
The vice-president went on to give a brief description of the mechanism by which the program might 
potentially harm the environment. He told the chairman that the new program would involve 
increasing production, which would lead to a 25% increase in carbon emissions. He was speaking 
from personal understanding—the vice-president understood why the new program would lead to the 
environment being harmed (and he was completely confident in the prediction that the new program 
would in fact lead to a 25% increase in carbon emissions). 
  
The chairman of the board listened to what the vice-president had to say, and understood why the 
new program would lead to the environment being harmed. He was also completely confident in the 
prediction that the new program would in fact lead to a 25% increase in carbon emissions. The 
chairman answered, ‘‘I don’t care at all about harming the environment. I just want to make as much 
profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.’ 
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They started the program. As predicted, the environment was harmed. 
 
In the versions in which the chairman and VP were stipulated not to understand why the new 
program would lead to the environment being harmed, the corresponding paragraphs read as follows: 
 
The vice-president went on to give a brief description of the mechanism by which the program 
might potentially harm the environment. He told the chairman that the new program would involve 
increasing production, which would lead to a 25% increase in carbon emissions. He was not 
speaking from personal understanding—the vice president did not himself understand why the new 
program would lead to the environment being harmed (but he was completely confident in the 
prediction that the new program would in fact lead to a 25% increase in carbon emissions). 
 
The chairman of the board listened to what the vice-president had to say, but did not really 
understand why the new program would lead to the environment being harmed. Nonetheless, he 
was also completely confident in the prediction that the new program would in fact lead to a 25% 
increase in carbon emissions. The chairman answered, ‘‘I don’t care at all about harming the 
environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.” 
 
After reading one of the eight vignettes, all participants were asked to rate their agreement with 
the following claim: 
a. The vice president offered the chairman an explanation of why the new program 
would harm the environment.  
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To ensure that this initial rating was not affected by first rating understanding, all other dependent 
variables were moved to a second page. The other statements were: 
b. The chairman understood why the new program would harm the environment. 
c. The vice-president understood why the new program would harm the environment.  
d. The chairman intentionally harmed the environment.  
e. The environment was harmed as a result of the new program. 
As before, b-d were treated as dependent variables or primary interest, whereas e was treated as a reading 
comprehension question to screen participants. 
Finally, participants completed an attention check and were asked demographic and debriefing 
questions. Participants who made errors on the comprehension question or attention check were excluded 
from further analysis.  
4.2 Results 
We first analyzed participants’ attributions of understanding to the chairman and the vice-president to 
verify that our experimental manipulation of understanding was effective, and in particular that 
participants accepted the stipulated levels of understanding. To do so, we analyzed understanding 
attributions with target as a within-subjects factor (2: VP, chairman), and the stipulated understanding for 
the VP (2: present, absent) and chairman (2: present, absent), as between-subjects factors. This analysis 
revealed the predicted main effects: participants gave higher mean attributions when VP understanding 
was stipulated, F(1, 378) = 196.113, p < .001, ηp2 = .342, and when the chairman’s understanding was 
stipulated, F(1, 378) = 92.288, p < .001, ηp2 = .196. There was also a main effect of target of attribution, with 
participants attributing higher understanding to the VP than to the chairman, F(1, 378) = 61.065, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .139.  
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Table 2 
Attributed Understanding in Experiment 3 as a Function of Stipulated Understanding 
 
 Stipulated 
VP 
Understand
ing 
Stipulated 
Chairman 
Understand
ing 
Mean 
Understand
ing 
Attribution 
SD N 
Chairman’s 
Understand
ing 
Yes Yes 5.86 1.378 99 
No 3.02 1.834 89 
Total 4.52 2.143 188 
No Yes 4.32 2.065 96 
No 2.37 1.689 98 
Total 3.34 2.120 194 
Total Yes 5.10 1.908 195 
No 2.68 1.785 187 
Total 3.92 2.209 382 
VP’s 
Understand
ing 
Yes Yes 6.27 .901 99 
No 5.96 1.215 89 
Total 6.12 1.070 188 
No Yes 3.41 2.014 96 
No 3.06 2.065 98 
Total 3.23 2.042 194 
Total Yes 4.86 2.112 195 
No 4.44 2.241 187 
Total 4.65 2.183 382 
 
 
These main effects were qualified by the expected two-way interactions: when it was stipulated 
that the VP understood, attributions of understanding for the VP rose more sharply than did attributions of 
understanding for the chairman, F(1,378) = 79.737, p < .001, ηp2 = .174, and when it was stipulated that the 
chairman understood, attributions of understanding for the chairman rose more sharply than did 
attributions of understanding for the VP, F(1, 378) = 106.678, p < .001, ηp2 = .220. Finally, there was a small 
but significant three-way interaction whereby it did not matter for attributions of understanding to the VP 
whether it was also stipulated that the chairman understood, whereas stipulating that the VP understood 
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affected participants who were told that the chairman understood more than it affected those who were 
told that the chairman did not understand, F(1, 378) = 5.158, p = .024, ηp2 = .013). (We hypothesize that 
people showed a particular resistance to the stipulation that the chairman understood when it had already 
been stipulated that the VP did not.) Moreover, the levels of attributed understanding were above the 
scale-midpoint when understanding was stipulated to be present, and below the scale mid-point when 
stipulated to be absent. 
 As in previous experiments, we also confirmed that the traditional SEE was replicated: a univariate 
ANOVA of intentionality ratings with the stipulated understanding of the VP (2: present, absent), the 
stipulated understanding of the chairman (2: present, absent), and norm status (2: conform, violate) as 
between-subjects factors revealed the predicted main effect of norm status, F(1, 374) = 19.973, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .051, with significantly lower ratings in the conform condition (N = 189, M =5.21, SD = 1.639) than the 
violate condition (N = 193, M = 5.88, SD = 1.289), and with a small-to-medium effect size. There was also a 
small interaction between norm status and VP understanding F(1, 374) = 4.659, p = .032, ηp2 = .012. This 
finding is neither predicted by nor in any way in opposition to our argument, though it does prefigure an 
important later finding that people put a great deal of stock in the presence or absence of understanding 
on the part of VP. 
Having established the efficacy of the experimental manipulation and having replicated the 
standard SEE, we next analyzed our dependent variable of primary interest: explanation ratings. Ratings 
were analyzed as the dependent variable in an ANOVA with the stipulated understanding of the VP (2: 
present, absent), the stipulated understanding of the chairman (2: present, absent), and norm status (2: 
conform, violate) as between-subjects factors (see Figure 3 and Figure 4).  
If explanation judgments are a function of understanding, we would expect to find main effects of 
the VPs stipulated understanding and/or of the chairman’s stipulated understanding. Both effects were 
observed: participants were more likely to indicate that the vice-president offered an explanation when he 
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(by stipulation) understood himself (N = 188, M = 5.26 SD = 1.649) than when he did not (N = 194, M = 3.50, 
SD = 2.089), F(1, 374) = 85.230, p < .001, ηp2 = .186 (see Figure 3a), and participants were more likely to say 
that the VP offered an explanation when the chairman (by stipulation) understood (N = 195, M = 4.83, SD = 
1.902) than when he did not (N = 187, M = 3.89, SD = 2.151), F(1, 374) = 21.909, p < .001, ηp2 = .055 (see 
Figure 3b). These factors did not interact with each other. 
If attributions of understanding are sufficient to screen off attributions of other mental states when 
attributing explanation, then we would expect the effect of norm conformity to vanish when understanding 
is fixed. This prediction was also confirmed: there was not a significant main effect of norm conformity on 
explanation ratings (violate: N = 193, M = 4.40, SD = 2.115, conform: N = 189, M = 4.33, SD = 2.047), F(1, 
374) = .189, p = .664, ηp2 = .001  (see Figure 4). Notably, though, there was one significant interaction: 
between norm conformity and chairman understanding. When chairman understanding was present, the 
ratings were numerically higher for violate than for conform. When chairman understanding was absent, 
the ratings were numerically higher for conform than for violate. This accounts for the significant 
interaction, but in no case was the difference between violate and conform itself significant. 
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Table 3 
Explanation Ratings in Experiment 3 by Norm Status and Stipulated Understanding 
 
Norm 
Status 
Stipulated VP 
Understanding 
Stipulated 
Chairman 
Understanding 
Mean 
Explanation 
Attribution 
SD N 
Conform Yes Yes 5.53 1.356 49 
No 4.96 1.609 45 
Total 5.26 1.502 94 
No Yes 3.55 2.052 47 
No 3.27 2.171 48 
Total 3.41 2.106 95 
Total Yes 4.56 1.988 96 
No 4.09 2.089 93 
Total 4.33 2.047 189 
Violate Yes Yes 5.86 1.262 50 
No 4.59 2.061 44 
Total 5.27 1.791 94 
No Yes 4.29 1.904 49 
No 2.90 2.033 50 
Total 3.59 2.080 99 
Total Yes 5.08 1.788 99 
No 3.69 2.205 94 
Total 4.40 2.115 193 
Total Yes Yes 5.70 1.313 99 
No 4.78 1.845 89 
Total 5.26 1.649 188 
No Yes 3.93 2.001 96 
No 3.08 2.099 98 
Total 3.50 2.089 194 
Total Yes 4.83 1.902 195 
No 3.89 2.151 187 
Total 4.37 2.079 382 
Finally, it’s worth noting the effect sizes associated with the vice president's understanding (ηp2 = 
.186) and the chairman’s understanding (ηp2 = .055). While both effects were significant, the former had a 
large effect size, while the latter had a medium effect size. 
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Figure 3: Mean explanation ratings as a function of the stipulated understanding of the VP (3a) and as a 
function of the stipulated understanding of the chairman (3b). Error Bars ± 1 SEM 
 
Figure 4: Mean explanation rating as a function of both stipulated chairman understanding and stipulated 
VP understanding. No differences based on conformity are significant. Error Bars ± 1 SEM 
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4.3 Discussion 
Experiment 3 confirmed our interpretation of Experiment 2, suggesting that attributions of 
explanation are in fact affected by attributions of understanding. Specifically, Experiment 3 went beyond 
the mediation analysis in Experiment 2 by demonstrating a causal effect of stipulated understanding on 
explanation judgments. The results also went beyond the initial experiments in showing that the vice-
president and the chairman’s understanding were both relevant, though to differing degrees. Perhaps most 
interestingly, given the robustness of the SEE as a measure of mental states exhibited in Experiments 1 and 
2 as well as elsewhere, there was no significant SEE exhibited for explanation once understanding was 
stipulated. This suggests that stipulating understanding is at least sufficient to block the influence of other 
mental states. If, for example, the audience’s desires were partially constitutive of explanation (and not 
captured somehow by attributions of understanding), then we would have expected an SEE even when 
understanding was held fixed.That the speaker’s understanding is more influential than the listener’s is a 
somewhat surprising result, even for psychologistic theories of explanation. Wilkenfeld (2014, p. 3371) is 
explicit that the relevant understanding when determining whether an explaining act has taken place (and 
hence, derivatively, whether one has an explanation) is the understanding of the audience. Similarly, while 
Achinstein (1983) argues that the intent of the speaker is relevant, the relevant intent to count as 
explaining is that which takes into account the potential understanding of the audience. Waskan et al. 
(2014) remain neutral on whose understanding is relevant, and so are consistent with the paramount 
importance of the speaker’s understanding, but do not predict these results. 
4.4 General Discussion 
Across three experiments, we find support for psychologism. First, we demonstrate by using the SEE that 
attributions of understanding are modulated by the same kinds of mental state inferences that affect 
attributions of intentional action, knowledge, and a variety of other mentalistic terms. We then 
demonstrate that attributions of explanation are similarly susceptible to an SEE. The dependence of 
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explanation on understanding is tested directly in Experiment 3: explanation judgments closely track 
stipulated understanding. Since explanation judgments do not exhibit an SEE when understanding is held 
fixed, there is reason to believe that understanding attribution is such a powerful driver of explanation 
attribution that it swamps other mental state attributions that might have been expected to produce an 
independent SEE.12 
 Taken together, these findings support accounts of explanation that situate explanation with regard 
to understanding and understanders at the expense of accounts that favor exclusively formal or objective 
criteria. This is a potentially surprising finding, as the majority of historical accounts have identified 
explanations with some privileged structure (e.g., Friedman 1974, Hempel 1965, Kitcher 1989) or content 
(e.g., Bechtel 2008, Machamer, Darden, & Craver 2000, Salmon 1971, Salmon 1984, Woodward 2003). 
Wilkenfeld and Lombrozo (2015) argue that even some putatively pragmatic accounts (Bromberger 1966, 
Garfinkel 1980, Van Fraassen 1980) ultimately ground explanation as a product of structure and content. By 
contrast, a minority view (e.g., Achinstein 1983, Scriven 1962, Wilkenfeld 2014) identifies explanations with 
some cognitive upshot (i.e., generating understanding), and so accord far better with the data collected 
here.13 
 Of course, one could dismiss the present data as irrelevant to the philosophical project of 
characterizing explanation. Our data certainly fall short of supporting normative conclusions about how 
explanations ought to be classified, and our stimuli were designed to reflect everyday explanations rather 
than explanations within science. That said, we think these findings should not be so easily dismissed, for 
three reasons. First, it is methodologically valuable to at least begin with the principle that the lay concept 
                                                          
12 Our framing of the discussion in terms of understanding attributions sidesteps the question of whether these 
patterns of behavior speak to the nature of the concept or to how people deploy it. This is arguably a feature, as 
Machery (2008) persuasively argues that such questions might be unanswerable given the present state of the 
philosophy of concepts. 
13 Of these views, Achinstein (1983) grounds explanation in the intent to produce understanding rather than in the 
success of such production; Scriven (1962) and Wilkenfeld (2014) are not committed to this role for intentions. 
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is continuous with the technical notion of explanation, as, if true, that assumption would yield a more 
unified view.14 We are inclined to follow a maxim of David Lewis (1980, 217): “We might settle for less, but 
let’s start by asking for all we want.” Second, at some level, projects of conceptual clarification must 
eventually answer to the tribunal of usage, or risk clarifying a totally different concept than the one of initial 
interest. Finally, even on the most dismissive view that the patterns exhibited here teach us nothing about 
people’s actual concepts of explanation or understanding, our findings still reveal potential biases in how 
people employ these concepts. As such, they tell us something about the starting point from which we 
theorize, which is valuable if for no other reason than telling us what biases to watch for in ourselves.15  
 
5. Alternative Hypotheses 
While we have so far eschewed committing to any one account of the SEE, our reliance on it as a marker of 
the mental might itself seem controversial. In this section, we explore what conclusions can be drawn on 
the basis of other accounts of the SEE. We will maintain that, whatever one’s account of the SEE, our data 
support psychologism about explanation. In any event, in order to be extensionally adequate, any account 
must accommodate our data. 
 First, we argue that on any account of the SEE, our results show that understanding attributions 
mediate explanation attributions. This follows from the mediation analyses in Experiment 2, and from the 
experimental manipulation of Experiment 3. The more surprising result, however, is the juxtaposition of 
Experiments 2 and 3. While Experiment 2 suggests that attributions of explanation are susceptible to a SEE 
(and therefore suggests a broad scope for SEE susceptibility), Experiment 3 shows that fixing understanding 
is sufficient to eliminate this effect on explanation (and this suggests a quite targeted set for the mental 
state inferences in operation). This has the interesting consequence of making our results of interest 
                                                          
14 In addition to Waskan et al (2014), Woodward (2003, Chapter 1) advocates a similar ideal. 
15 Alexander and Weinberg (2007) make a similar point. 
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regardless of how broad the set of attributions ultimately found to exhibit an SEE turns out to be. The 
narrower the set, the more surprising the finding that explanation (and understanding) fall within it. For 
example, if only beliefs-conjoined-with-an-intention are subject to an SEE, then it would be very surprising 
that judgments of explanation are so affected. Conversely, the broader the set, the more exciting the result 
that Experiment 3 does not detect any SEE once we control for understanding.16 For example, suppose that 
attributions of any state to any kind of a person—epistemic, mental, physical, etc.—are ultimately found to 
be subject to an SEE. In that case Experiment 3 not only demonstrates psychologism about explanation, but 
a particularly well-behaved psychologism about explanation—since understanding is sufficient to block the 
influence of other SEE-susceptible states. This result would go far beyond what is shown by Experiment 3 
alone, or in concert with the Waskan et al. results. 
 Thus, while we settled on one account of the SEE to motivate our use of the SEE to investigate 
psychologism, one who doubts the correctness of this account can see our conclusion as disjunctive: either 
psychologism is true in a surprisingly interesting way, or a surprisingly understanding-specific psychologism 
(where understanding attributions block other mental effects with respect to explanation attributions) is 
true. (Given the ever-widening scope of the SEE, we strongly suspect the latter.) In either case we have 
made a valuable conceptual advance. Our initial conception of the SEE was thus a ladder which can be 
kicked away once our ultimate conclusion is reached (somewhat akin to Wittgenstein’s 2013/1921 
Proposition 6.54). 
 While other hypotheses could be proposed to explain our data, all of the alternatives of which we 
are aware face difficulty. For instance, one possibility is that understanding attributions depend on 
explanation attributions, rather than the reverse. This possibility is challenged by the mediation analyses 
                                                          
16 This point about mitigating the SEE is even more poignant if the SEE is not restricted to mental states at all, as 
perhaps suggested by the example of ‘caused’ in Knobe and Fraser (2008). That being said, also note that the obvious 
way to connect causal judgments to mental-state judgments in terms of responsibility (see n. 7) does not apply to this 
case, as offering the explanation of why the decision will yield the result does not confer responsibility for that result.  
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from Experiment 2: the effect of norm conformity on understanding attributions was not mediated by 
explanation.  Moreover, this possibility would require additional assumptions to make sense of the 
experimental results from Experiment 3: why would stipulating the presence or absence of understanding 
eliminate the SEE for explanation? A related possibility is that the relationship between understanding and 
explanation is evidential, rather than constitutive. That is, the presence or absence of understanding might 
affect attributions of explanation not because psychologism is true, but because the presence of 
understanding is good evidence that an explanation was offered, and the absence of understanding is good 
evidence than an explanation was withheld. This possibility fits squarely within traditional accounts of 
understanding, which identify it very closely with explanatory knowledge (e.g., Hempel 1965, Khalifa 
forthcoming). Moreover, this idea is consistent with the result from Experiment 3 that stipulating 
understanding affected attributions of explanation. However, we would again have expected attributions of 
explanation to mediate the effect of norm-conformity on understanding attributions on Experiment 2 (if 
explanations are thought to reliably affect understanding). Moreover, even granting that the presence or 
absence of understanding plays an evidential role in explanation attribution, the complete absence of an 
SEE in Experiment 3 suggests something stronger. If the evidence provided by understanding were 
independent of the pathway by which explanation judgments exhibit an SEE (for example, if part of the 
explanation SEE were the result of people attributing desires to the VP or the chairman), it would be 
puzzling why Experiment 3 would see the SEE vanish completely.  
 Another possibility is that norm conformity influenced attributions of explanation not because of its 
impact on mental state inferences, but because of its influence on participants’ causal representations.17 
Specifically, prior work has found that people disproportionately attribute causal force to an agent who 
violated a norm relative to an agent who engaged in the same behavior while conforming to a norm (Knobe 
                                                          
17 We are grateful to a reviewer and to Joshua Knobe (in conversation) for articulating interesting versions of this 
proposal. 
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& Fraser 2008). Perhaps in the violate case, participants were more inclined to attribute to the chairman (or 
the VP) causal force in producing the side effect. As a result, they could have been more compelled to judge 
that the side effect was well explained, and retrospectively that the vice-president offered a better 
explanation. This hypothesis accounts for our data without any assumption of psychologism. However, we 
find three main problems with this causal-attribution hypothesis. First, and most importantly, what was 
being explained was why the process would cause the side effect, not why the chairman’s decision would 
cause the side effect, nor why the VP’s recommendation would do so. It’s not immediately obvious why the 
perceived causal role of an agent would affect the status of an explanation for why a subsequent process 
generated a particular effect. Research on causal chains has indeed found that in some cases, attributing 
greater causal responsibility to an earlier cause decreases the perceived causal role of a later cause (e.g., 
Murray & Lombrozo, 2017); such an effect in this case would, if anything, predict a pattern opposite to that 
observed. Second, this hypothesis cannot readily explain the mediation results from Experiment 2. If norm 
conformity affected causal attributions, which in turn affected explanatory judgments, we might have 
expected explanation attributions to mediate the effect of norm conformity on understanding attributions, 
or for the effect to be symmetrical. But this is not what we found: there was instead an asymmetrical effect 
whereby understanding attributions mediated the effect of norm conformity on explanation attributions. 
Finally, this hypothesis would face the puzzle of explaining why an explanation SEE was not found in 
Experiment 3. If the effect was due to causal attributions, why would stipulating understanding block this 
effect? 
 Of course, there are no doubt other candidate explanations for our data. However, at this point we 
take the burden to have been shifted to the anti-psychologist to produce an alternative. 
Finally, our results not only speak to psychologism about explanation, but also serve as a constraint 
on the correct theory of the SEE. Whatever theory one has for the SEE, one must account for why it applies 
to understanding directly, but applies to explanation derivatively. This constraint causes a prima facie 
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difficulty to, for example, Hindricks’ account, according to which what people exhibiting an SEE track is 
agents’ insensitivity to norms. This account does not really make sense of our case, as there is no operative 
norm to which the vice-president (who is the subject of the effect) is being insensitive. As another example, 
the present finding is prima facie evidence against Machery’s (2008) ‘trade-off hypothesis’ that people 
think those who accrue costs do so intentionally, as the vice-president did not incur any costs of note.  
 
 
6. Relation to ‘Explanatory anti-psychologism overturned by lay and scientific case classifications’ 
Reassuringly, our results are quite consistent with those found by Waskan et al. in their 2014 paper, 
‘Explanatory anti-psychologism overturned by lay and scientific case classifications.’ Much of what we have 
done amounts to a conceptual replication of their results. Moreover, we endorse their arguments for the 
value of investigating laypeople’s and scientists’ explanatory judgments: evidence of massive discordance 
between common intuitions and the presumptions of philosophers speaks against the general methodology 
of ignoring the psychological aspects of explanation. For the very reason that we share so many similarities, 
however, it is worth being explicit about the ways in which our results differ from theirs. 
 First, and perhaps most importantly, we show that there is strong reason to believe not only that 
explanations are judged by the extent to which they produce some mental state (namely understanding), 
but that understanding is sufficient to play this mental state role. Moreover, by providing simple candidate 
explanations – rather than stipulating the properties of underspecified explanatory models in science – we 
can be more confident that it was understanding itself that played this role, and not an inference to some 
other feature. 
 A second major difference between our results and those of Waskan et al. is our attempt to isolate 
exactly whose understanding is relevant. We find that explanation is particular-audience- and speaker-
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understanding-relative. The stimuli used by Waskan et al. varied in whether it was the explainer whose 
understanding was required, or the scientific community generally (though even in the former case, the 
text specified that the information was made publicly accessible and was easy to understand). Moreover, 
the relatively stronger impact of the understanding of the speaker is an unexpected finding. 
 A third difference is that we extend Waskan et al.’s results from scientific models to more everyday 
scenarios in which explanations are offered. Without this demonstration it would be risky to generalize 
about the nature of explanation from the scientific case alone; it would always be possible that scientific 
explanation is constrained by norms specific to science. 
 Fourth, our studies used very different methods from those of Waskan et al., and so it is revealing 
that they support similar conclusions. Experiment 2 used a new, indirect measure of the effect of mental 
state attributions on explanation, and Experiment 3 involved direct experimental manipulations of which 
particular individuals achieved understanding. 
 In sum, our findings both support and complement those of Waskan et al. using very different 
methods; they not only offer convergent evidence, but also help sharpen the claim that understanding is 
the critical mental state behind folk psychologism about explanation. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Across three experiments, we find support for a psychologism about explanation of a surprisingly robust 
variety. In so doing, we not only shed light on the folk conception of explanation and its relationship to 
understanding, but also uncover new data that must be accommodated by any theory that claims to make 
sense of the SEE. 
 
Acknowledgements: We would like to thank the University of California, Berkeley, the University of 
41 
 
 
Pittsburgh (including the Center for Philosophy of Science and the department of History and Philosophy of 
Science), and grants from the John Templeton Foundation and James S. McDonnell Foundation for their 
generous support. We would also like to thank Joshua Knobe and James Beebe for helpful conversation.  
  
42 
 
 
References 
Achinstein, P. (1983). The Nature of Explanation. Oxford University Press. 
Alexander, J., & Weinberg, J. M. (2007). Analytic epistemology and experimental philosophy. 
Philosophy Compass, 2(1), 56–80. 
Alfano, M., Beebe, J., & Robinson, B. (2012). The Centrality of Belief and Reflection in Knobe-Effect 
Cases. The Monist, 95(2), 264–289. 
Bechtel, W. (2007). Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience. 
Psychology Press. 
Beebe, J. (2013). A Knobe Effect for Belief Ascriptions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4(2), 
235–258. 
Beebe, J. R., & Buckwalter, W. (2010). The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect. Mind and Language, 25(4), 
474–498. 
Bromberger, Sylvain. (n.d.). Why Questions. In Mind and cosmos: Essays in contemporary science and 
philosophy (pp. 86–110). Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press. 
Crump, M. J., McDonnell, J. V., & Gureckis, T. M. (2013). Evaluating Amazon’s Mechanical Turk as a 
tool for experimental behavioral research. PloS One, 8(3), e57410. 
Dalbauer, N., & Hergovich, A. (2013). Is What is Worse More Likely?—The Probabilistic Explanation 
of the Epistemic Side-Effect Effect. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4(4), 639–657. 
De Regt, H. W., & Dieks, D. (2005). A contextual approach to scientific understanding. Synthese, 
144(1), 137–170. 
Downs, J. S., Holbrook, M. B., Sheng, S., & Cranor, L. F. (2010). Are your participants gaming the 
system?: screening mechanical turk workers. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human 
Factors in Computing Systems (pp. 2399–2402). ACM. Retrieved from 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1753688 
43 
 
 
Friedman, M. (1974). Explanation and Scientific Understanding. Journal of Philosophy, 71(1), 5–19. 
Garfinkel, A. (1981). Forms of explanation. Yale University Press New Haven. 
Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. The 
Free Press. 
Hempel, C. G., & Oppenheim, P. (1948). Studies in the Logic of Explanation. Philosophy of Science, 
15(2), 135–175. 
Kelp, C. (2015). Understanding Phenomena. Synthese, 192(12), 3799–3816. 
Khalifa, K. (Forthcoming). Understanding, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kim, J. (1994). Explanatory knowledge and metaphysical dependence. Philosophical Issues, 5, 51–69. 
Kitcher, P. (1989). Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World. In P. Kitcher & W. 
Salmon (Eds.), Scientific Explanation (pp. 410–505). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Knobe, J. (2003). Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language. Analysis, 63(3), 190–194. 
Knobe, J., & Fraser, B. (2008). Causal Judgment and Moral Judgment: Two Experiments. In W. Sinnott-
Armstrong (Ed.), Moral Psychology. MIT Press. 
Knuuttila, T., & Merz, M. (2009). An Objectual Approach to Scientific Understanding: The Case of 
Models. In H. D. Regt, S. Leonelli, & K. Eigner (Eds.), Scientific Understanding: Philosophical 
Perspectives (pp. 146–168). University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Lewis, D. (1980). Mad pain and Martian pain. Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, 1, 216–222. 
Lipton, P. (2009). Understanding without explanation. In H. W. De Regt, K. Eigner, & S. Leonelli 
(Eds.), Scientific understanding: Philosophical perspectives (pp. 43–63).  
Lombrozo, T., & Wilkenfeld, D. (2015). Inference to the Best Explanation Versus Explaining for the 
Best Inference. Science and Education, 24(9–10), 1059–1077. 
44 
 
 
Machamer, P. K., Darden, L., & Craver, C. F. (2000). Thinking About Mechanisms. Philosophy of 
Science, 67(1), 1–25. 
Machery, E. (2006). The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and Experimental Issues. 
Mind and Language, 23(2), 165–189. 
Murray, D., & Lombrozo, T. (2017). Effects of manipulation on attributions of causation, free will, and 
moral responsibility. Cognitive science, 41(2), 447-481. 
Oppenheimer, D. M., Meyvis, T., & Davidenko, N. (2009). Instructional manipulation checks: Detecting 
satisficing to increase statistical power. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45(4), 867–
872. 
Pettit, D., & Knobe, J. (2009). The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment. Mind and Language, 24(5), 
586–604. 
Salmon, W. C. (1971). Statistical Explanation & Statistical Relevance. Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
Scriven, M. (1963). Explanations, predictions, and laws. In Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science (Vol. 3, pp. 170–229). 
Trout, J. D. (2002). Scientific Explanation and the Sense of Understanding. Philosophy of Science, 69(2), 
212–233. 
Uttich, K., & Lombrozo, T. (2010). Norms inform mental state ascriptions: A rational explanation for the 
side-effect effect. Cognition, 116(1), 87–100. 
Van Fraassen, B. C. (1980). The scientific image. Oxford University Press.  
Waskan, J. (2011). Intelligibility and the CAPE: Combatting Anti-Psychologism About Explanation. 
Waskan, J., Harmon, I., Horne, Z., Spino, J., & Clevenger, J. (2013). Explanatory Anti-Psychologism 
Overturned by Lay and Scientific Case Classifications. Synthese, 191(5), 1–23. 
Wilkenfeld, D. A. (2013). Understanding as representation manipulability. Synthese, 190(6), 997–1016. 
45 
 
 
Wilkenfeld, D. A. (2014). Functional Explaining: A New Approach to the Philosophy of Explanation. 
Synthese, 191(14), 3367–3391. 
Wilkenfeld, D. A., Plunkett, D., & Lombrozo, T. (2016). Depth and Deference: When and Why We 
Attribute Understanding. Philosophical Studies, 173(2), 373–393. 
Wittgenstein, L. (2013/1921). Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Routledge. 
Woodward, J. (2003). Making things happen: A theory of causal explanation. Oxford University Press. 
Ylikoski, P. (2009). The Illusion of Depth of Understanding in Science. In H. D. Regt, S. Leonelli, & K. 
Eigner (Eds.), Scientific Understanding: Philosophical Perspectives. University of Pittsburgh Press. 
 
 
 
